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APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the Lower Court err in dismissing the Butcher's Cause of Action as being barred by
the Statute of Limitations.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Statutes
This appeal addresses the manner in which the district court applied the six year statute
of limitations, Sections 78-12-1 and 78-12-23, U.C.A., I953, as amended, to bar an
accounting under a written land development contract stipulation to apportion and account for
the proceeds from the sales of certain lands,. Section 78-12-1, U.C.A., reads as follows:
"78-12-1. Time for Commencement of actions generally.-Civil actions can
be commenced only within the period prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action
shall have accrued, except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by
statute."
Section 78-12-23, U.C.A., reads as follows:
"78-23-23. Within six years.-Within six years:
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real property.
(2) An action upon any contract, obligations or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing, except those mentioned in the preceding section [78-12-22].
More particularly, it addresses the Lower Court's failure to extend the time period
pursuant to Section 78-12-44, U.C.A., I953, as amended, for bringing an action for an
accounting another six years from the date Mr. Gilroy received payment of all or part of the
principal and interest under the contract when he sold the property to his son's corporation
without notice to the Butchers. Section 78-12-44 reads as follows:
"78-12-44. Payment-Acknowledgment-Promise to pay extends period.
-In anv case founded on contract, when anv part of the principal or interest shall have
been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to
pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought within the period
prescribed for the same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such
acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby.
When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable
either as a cause of faction or ground of defense. (Emphasis added).
-iv-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The lower court dismissed the Butcher's action for an accounting and review of the
reasonableness of the terms of the sale under a written settlement agreement where the proceeds
of the sale of certain real estate were to be divided 32% to the appellants-Butchers and 68% to
respondents-Gilroy and his family corporation R.G.H., Inc. owned and controlled by his son on
the grounds that the statute of limitations had run.
The Butchers challenge this ruling under the facts of this case upon the grounds that where
one mutual obligor received the proceeds from the land sale within the statute of limitations
time period, it extended the statutory time period to run another six years from receipt of the
sale proceeds. Co-obligor Frank G. Gilroy sold the property in question just prior to the
lapsing of the statute of limitations to a family corporation, R.G.H., Inc., and restarted the six
year statute of limitations from the date of sale. As suit was brought within six years from the
date of the land sale, the Butchers contend that Frank G. Gilroy was liable for an accounting and
review of the reasonableness of the terms of the sale under the terms of the stipulation. As this
accounting cause of action was initiated within the extended period of the statute of limitations,
the lower court's ruling should be reversed and remanded for an accounting and review of the
reasonableness of the terms of the land sale.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WENDELL L BUTCHER and
IRENE B. BUTCHER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
Supreme Court No. 20592
Court of Appeals No. 860111-CA

vs.
FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H., INC.,
a Utah corporation
Defendants and Respondents

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
This is an action for an accounting and review of the reasonableness of the terms of a land
sale under a settlement agreement where the proceeds of the sale were to be divided 32% to the
Butchers and 68% to Frank K. Gilroy.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For purposes of the appeal, the facts alleged in the Butcher's Amended Complaint are
deemed admitted; see Bryan vs. Stillwater Board of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1319,1321 (10th Cir.
1977)
Paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint alleged that on or about October 18,1971, Wendell
L. Butcher, Irene B. Butcher, and Frank K. Gilroy entered into a written Settlement Agreement
concerning a dispute of 33 acres abutting the Mountain Dell Golf Course owned by the Butchers
and wrongfully conveyed by the Butcher's former attorney, Peter M. Lowe, to Frank K. Gilroy, a
copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint (R. 37-41).
Paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint further alleged that Frank K. Gilroy was to hold
title to the 33 acres surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the requirement in paragraph 6
of the stipulation that he sell the property by April, I976 for the best price attainable and the
proceeds be apportioned with 32% paid to the Butchers and 68% paid to Frank K. Gilroy (R.34).
Paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint alleged that the Butchers and Frank K. Gilroy
attempted to sell the property over the years, but because of various subdivision development
changes and watershed questions, the parties were delayed in selling the property (R.34-35).

Paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint alleged that on or about March 8,1982, within six
years of the performance sale date of April, 1976, Frank K. Gilroy sold the property in question
to R.G.H., Inc. without notifying the Butchers or accounting to them for their share of the
proceeds (R.35). A copy of the warranty deed was attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit
B (R. 42).
The Butchers continued to attempt to sell the property and periodically notified Frank K.
Gilroy of their progress in this regard. Frank K. Gilroy at no time notified plaintiffs that he had
sold the property, and continued to encourage the Butchers in their efforts to find a buyer and
acquire the necessary building permits from Salt Lake City. Based upon Frank K. Gilroy's
representations and assurances that he was also trying to perform the contract, the Butchers
continued to attempt to sell the property and work with the city to obtain permits for the
property (Paragraph 7, Amended Complaint, R. 35).
To date, Frank K. Gilroy has failed to account to the Butchers or pay them the amounts due
and owing under the stipulated agreement as was repeatedly promised (Paragraph 8, Amended
Complaint R.35).
The Butchers therefore requested the court to require Frank K. Gilroy to account for all
monies received and to apportion the same between the parties under the terms of the stipulated
agreement. In the event Frank K. Gilroy failed to acquire fair market value for the property,
they requested a judgment against him in the amount of any deficiency. (Paragraph 8, Amended
Complaint, R.35).
After the Butchers filed their Amended Complaint, defendants and respondents refused to
produce any discovery documents pursuant to the Butchers' Motion to Produce (R. 18). Instead,
the defendants and respondents moved to dismiss the action based on the statute of limitations
(R.47). The lower court then dismissed the Action (R. 82,83), even though the Butchers
apprised the court in their February 14,1985 Supplemental Reply Memorandum that defendant
Gilroy was absent from the State to prevent the tolling of the statute and that both defendants and
respondents repeatedly promised to try and sell the property to induce plaintiffs from suing (R.
75). From the order of dismissal, this appeal was taken.
ARGUMENT
CAUSE OF ACTION NOT BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
An action based upon a written contract must be commenced within six years after the
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cause of action occurred; see Section 78-12-1, Section 78-12-23(2), U.C.A., I953, as
amended. Thus, the accounting action had to be initiated on or before April, I982 (six years
after the date specified for sale sale of the property by April, I976) unless Frank K. Gilroy
engaged in some type of conduct to extend the statutory period. The Butchers argue that Frank K.
Gilroy's secret March I982 sale of the real estate to R.G.H., Inc. was the date from which the
statute of limitations ran on their action for an accounting in the same manner suites based on
breach of warranty do not begin to run until the date of a sale of an article; see M.H. Walker
Realty Co. vs. American Surety Co. of New York, 60 U. 435, 211 P. 998 (1922).
Under Section 78-12-44, U.C.A., I953, as amended, if respondents received payments of
any part of the principal or interest due under the contract, the statute of limitations runs anew
from the date of receipt of payment. Section 78-12-44, U.C.A., I953, as amended, reads as
follows:
"78-12-44. Payment-acknowledgment-promise to pay extends
period. In any case, founded on contract, when any part of the principal or
interest shall have been paid...an action may be brought within the period
prescribed for the same after such payment,...."
Frank K. Gilroy received payment for the property subject to the written stipulation in
March, I982. Receipt of this payment extend the statute of limitations for an accounting for
another six years from the date of payment - i.e. March, I988. Suit for an accounting and review
of the terms of sale was brought in I984 well within the extended period of time, since the
contract in question required both the Butchers and Frank H. Gilroy to mutually attempt to sell
the property and then account to one another for the profits received. As a consequence, the
statute of limitations began to run anew the moment the cause of action for an accounting and
review of the sale terms arose when the funds were received; see Frederickson vs. Knight Land
Co., 667 P.2d 34 (I983) where the Utah Supreme Court indicated that on a contract to mutually
account for proceeds received from the sale of the land, the statute of limitations begins to run
again on the date of the breach for failure to account for funds received from the land sale.
Frank K. Gilroy sold the land in question to R.G.H., Inc. in March, I982, within the statute
of limitations period, and failed to have the terms of the sale approved by or account to the
Butchers for their portion of the sale proceeds. As a consequence, a breach occurred within the
statutory time period and restarted the six year statute to run from the date the Frank K. Gilroy
received the funds. As suit was brought within six years from the date of this breach, the statute
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of limitations does not bar the action. The motion to dismiss was therefore improperly granted,
under the Frederickson case criteria reaffirming the mutual accounting doctrines contained in
Toponce vs. Corinne Mill and Stock Company, 6 Utah 439, 24 P.2d 493, affirmed 152 U.S. 405,
14 S.Ct. 632 (1890).
Based on the foregoing case law, and the fact that Frank K. Gilroy concealed the sale and
repeatedly encouraged the Butchers to try and sell the property to prevent Butchers from suing
(R. 35), he should be estopped from the raising the defense of the statute of limitations; see Rapp
vs. Rapp, 218 Cal 505, 24 P.2d 161 (1933).
The Butchers also pointed out in their supplemental reply memorandum to the lower court
that there is a question of fact as to whether the Gilroys, who maintain a Nevada residence, were
absent from the state a sufficient time to prevent the tolling of the statute. Frank K. Gilroy's
extended stays in Nevada would delay the tolling of the statute of limitations, until their return
under Section 78-12-35, U.C.A., I953, as amended; see Snyder vs. Clune, 390 P.2d 9I5,15 U.2d
54 (I964). To resolve this issue, the lower court should have reserved ruling on the matter
until after discovery had been completed. As Utah is a notice pleading state, issues regarding the
tolling of the statutes of limitation involve questions of fact which cannot be resolved solely from
the face of the complaint.
Nor can R.G.H., Inc. be arbitrarily dismissed from the cause of action as a matter of law.
Since Frank K. Gilroy refused to undergo discovery, the Butchers were not able to determine if
the sale of the property was an installment sale, a conditional sale, or an outright sale. If the sale
was conditional, the property would revert back to Frank K. Gilroy upon default of the conditions.
Title would not be able to be cleared without R.G.H., Inc.'s joinder as a necessary party. If the
funds were to be paid over a period of time, then R.G.H., Inc. was a also a necessary party to
insure that the funds were paid into court until the accounting was completed.
In summary, the cause of action was initiated within the extended statute of limitations
time period, and the lower court erred as a matter of law in granting the motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Butchers respectfully request the court to reverse the
lower court's Order and remand the case for an accounting and review of the reasonableness of the
terms of the land sale. Respondents are seeking a windfall of the fair market value of the sale
proceeds where were to be divided 32% to the Butchers and the 68% balance to respondents.
Frank K. Gilroy has converted the proceeds of the sale and should not be rewarded for his
-4-

clandestine bad faith actions.
Dated this ^H

day of April, 1987.
Respectfully submitted,

By ^ ^ — "

-^7,

,

^

-

Marcus G. Theodore
Attorney for Wendell L Butcher and Irene B.
Butcher

CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Appellants Brief were served by mailing
the same, first class, postage prepaid, this ^

y

day of April, 1987 to the following:
James R. Holbrook
Steven E. Tyler
Russell C. Kearl

GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER
Suite 800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: 801-530-7300
Attorneys for Respondents.
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COMPIAENT AND ORDER

—

Marcus G. Theodore
Attorney for Plaintiff
Valley Tower, Suite 701
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 359-8622
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WENDELL L. BUTCHER and IRENE B.
BUTCHER,
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C84-1826

vs

Judge Leary

FRANK K. GILROY, and R.G.H.
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants,
COME NOW Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher and
allege as follows:
1.
Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher are residents
of the State of Utah.
2.
Frank K. Gilroy is a resident of the State of Utah.
3.
R.G.H., Inc. is a Utah corporation.
4.
On or about October 18, 1971, Wendell L. Butcher,
Irene B. Butcher, and Frank K. Gilroy stipulated to an entry
of an order and judgment as Civil No. 179775. As part of the
stipulation, a settlement agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A.
was entered into. Frank K. Gilroy was to hold title to 33 acres
surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the requirement
in paragraph 6 that he sell the property by April, 1976 for the
best price attainable and the proceeds be apportioned with
32% paid to the plaintiffs and 68% paid to the defendant.
5.
Plaintiffs and Frank K. Gilroy attempted to sell the
property over the years but because of various subdivision

development changes and watershed questions, the parties were
delayed in selling the property.
6.
On or about March 8, 1982, within six years of the
performance sale date of April, 1976, Frank K. Gilroy sold the
property in question to R.G.H., Inc. without notifying
plaintiffs or accounting to them for their share of the proceeds.
A copy of the warranty deed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.,
and by this reference incorporated herein.
7.
Plaintiffs continued to attempt to sell the property
and periodically notified Frank K. Gilroy of their progress in
this regard. Frank K. Gilroy at no time notified plaintiffs
that he had sold the property, and continued to encourage
plaintiffs in their efforts to find a buyer and acquire the
necessary building permits from Salt Lake City. Based upon
Frank K. Gilroyfs representation and assurances that he was also
trying to perform the contract, plaintiffs continued to attempt
to sell the property and work with the city to obtain permits
for the property.
8.
To date, Frank K. Gilroy has failed to account to
plaintiffs or pay them the amounts due and owing under the
stipulated agreement as was repeatedly promised.
9.
Plaintiffs therefore request the court to require Frank
K. Gilroy to account for all moneys received and to apportion the
same between the parties under the terms of the stipulated agreement.
In the event Frank K. Gilroy failed to acquire fair market value
for the property, for a judgment against him in the amount of any
deficiency.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:
1.
For the court to require Frank K. Gilroy to account to
plaintiffs for all sums received from the sale of the property.
2.
For judgment to be entered against Frank K. Gilroy
for the amounts due and owing plaintiffs under the stipulated
agreement.
3.
For such other and further relief as the court may
-2-

deem just and equitable under the premises.
DATED this /o^day of August, 1984.

-^MARCUS G. THEODORE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Address of Plaintiffs:
3980 Eldorado Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Amended Complaint was mailed first class postage
prepaid this 16th day of October, 1984 to Steven E. Tyler,
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hansen, 175 South West Temple,
#700, Salt Lake City, UT 84101.

(vijOtts ~U3ot*U#r>-^
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this

day of

October, 1971, by and between Wendell L. Butcher, hereinafter
referred to as "Butcher" and Frank K. Gilroy, hereinafter referred
to as "Gilroy".
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, the above named parties are presently involved in
Jit ip-iiJoj) in the Third Judicial District Court in Case No. 179775,
entitled "Frank K. Gilroy, Plaintiff, vs. Peter M. Lowe, el al.,
Defendants"; and
WHEREAS, both Gilroy and Butcher have claims against each
otln ] and desire to resolve and settle said claims prior to the
final judgment of the Court trying this matter.
NOW, THLREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of
Die mutual promises of the parties contained herein, the parties
agree as follows:
1.

Gilroy will pay to Butcher the sum of $35,000 cash, pay-

able within five (5) days of the date of this Agreement.
2.

Butcher hereby acknowledges that the foregoing sum is

received a^ complete satisfaction of his claim against Frank K.
lliljuy J c> J damage? , and b o o b y waives all claim and intoreM

in find

1d the piopoly known as Mountain Dell Estates, which is the subject
mat t o of the above mentioned litigation.

It is recognized that

Buiehers have heretofore elected to abandon any rights under Die
contjaet d.jted July 20, 1903, relative to the Mountain Dell properties,

37
i nd r h a l l

s t i p u l a t e t h a t a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment may be e n t e r e d
tboein.

D»e\

h«*vc no i n t o - e s t

thai

t h e pending Counterclaim by B u t c h e r s a g a i n s t G i l r o y s h a l l be

d» c nii«scd with p i e j u d i c e .

But o h o s s h a l l

Butcher s h a l l quit

fin t h e r

that

stipulate

claim t o G i J m \

any

and a l l r i g h t , t i t l e or i n t e r e s t he may have or claim in and t o
t h e Mountain Dell p r o p e r t i e s , and t h e s o - c a l l e d F i s l i e r and \\\,nd
pi ( . p a r t i e s .

Butchers and G i l r o y s h a l l p r o v i d e t o each o t h e r r e c i p r o -

cal (^ n o al R e l e a s e s of a l l

claims or l i a b i l i t i e s

to d a t e .
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3.

Butcher agrees to obtain approval from the appropriate

county and state authorities for permission to subdivide the Mountain
Dell property and shall be entitled to a period of 36 months from
the date of this Agreement to obtain such approval.

Gilroy agrees

to execute such documents as owner of the properties as may be
required in order to obtain sucli approval, provided, however, that
Gilroy shall not be required to expend any funds in connection with
the effort tc obtain said subdivision approval and all costs in connection therewith will be Butcher's expense.

It is understood that

subdivision approval and all development work and expense in order
to obtain approval of a contemplated subdivision of the Mountain Dell
properties shall be the responsibility and at the sole expense of
Butchcj .

Gilroy shall have no responsibility whatsoever in subdivi-

sion approval, or any developmental work and expense in connection
therewith, 03 any subsequent developmental wor); and expense of any
kind or nature whatsoever.

Subdivision approval shall mean absolute

approval of the subdivision, including approvals of going forth absolutely for the sale of lots, including but not limited io health
Department approvals, Water Department approvals, Zoning Department
approvals, State Highway approvals, approvals of all government a3
agencies and clearances of any kind or nature whatsoever in ordc1 to
go forward and sell lots without any restrictions of any kind.
*i.

Butcher agrees to employ the firm of Coon. King K knowlton

or some other competent engineering firm mutually agreed upon to assist
him in obtaining the approval of the subdividing of the Mountain Dell
Lstate properties and to pay all costs in connection therewith and
in audition any legal or other expenses necessary to obtain such
approval .

Butcher agrees to follow the recommendations of such

engineers in obtaining such subdivision approval, and it is nude 1 slood Hi, I i J thi subdivisionfippjoval is not obtained by i 1 a.« on of
Butcher's failure to follow the recommendations of the engineering
firm employed to assist in obtaining subdivision approval his recovery
from the sale or disposition of the property as hereinafter provided
sliall he reduced by 10/o.

38
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EXHIBIT A
Page 2 of 5

5.

In the event the subdivision is approved within 36

months from the date of this Agreement, the first proceeds from
the sale of lots shall be paid to Gilroy until Gilroy lias received
the sum of $80,SOS•SB, together with interest thereon from the date
of this Agreement to the date of payment calculated at a rate of 8%
per annum.

Provided, that in the event Gilroy is required to pay

interest on the $35,000 paid to Butcher in connection with this
settlement agreement, Butcher will pay such additional interest
rate, but not more than a total rate of 9% per annum as to the
'Tirst proceeds1' shall mean the net proceeds from the

$3S 9 000.

sale of each lot, less escrow fees and expenses of sale.
0.

In the event butcher is unable to obtain subdivision

approval within 30 months from the date of this Agreement, then, and
in thai event, the Mountain Dell Estates property shall be sold or
disposed of for the best price obtainable, and from the proceeds of
sue)-) saJe Gilroy aiax3 JJutcber will receive a proportionate share based
upon the investment of Gilroy in the property of $80,50B.S8 and the
investment of Butcher in the property of $40,877.43.

The sale or dis-

po«:it ion shall be conducted within 18 months immediately following
tiif cxpiiat ion of the 30 month period set forth in paragraph 3 heroin,
and ?.neb sa.le or disposition shall be conducted by Gilroy at a juice
to be uet ojjiiined by Gilroy in bis own discretion.
7.

It is understood that Gilroy or his designated attorney

in fact will execute all documents reasonably necessary in order to
obtain subdivision approval, including but not limited to the Petition
for Subdivision Approval, the application to the State of Utah for
p• m i s s i o n to sell subdivided lands and any other petitions, documents
and/or agreements with the municipality of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
Cni.vity, Plate of Utah, and/or any subdivisions thereof, provided,
however, in all such documents there shall be a disclosure of the
fuct that Gilroy lias not undertaken any responsibility or liability
?n conned ion with the approval of the subdivision or any developmental work of any kind or nature whatsoever.
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EXHIBIT A
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8.

In the event at any time Gilroy is not satisfied with

the progress being made in connection with the effort to obtain subdivision approval, he shall have the right and option, at his own
expense, to provide additional legal or engineering assistance, but
sucli assistance will not be chargeable against Butcher's ultimate
recovery from the sale of the property if the subdivision approval
is not obtained or from the sale of lots if the subdivision approval
is obtained.

In no event shall the providing of such legal or engi-

neering assistance be construed to obligate Gilroy to perform any
of the subdivision or developmental responsibilities herein, nor
excuse Butcher therefrom.
1).

Butcher hereby agrees to defend Gilroy from any claim,

lien or assertion of judgment or other rights as againsl the Mountain
Ik .1.1 property or as against Gilroy relative to the Mountain Dell
property, provided, however, that Butcher shall have 'no liability
therewith except to provide and pay for sue!) defense.
10.

It is agreed that Gilroy shall be provided with a copy

of all documents, correspondence or writings which shall be sent or
received in connection with attempts to gain subdivision approval,
developmental work and any other matter inconneetion with the Mountain
Dell properties.

Upon request not more often than each six months,

Gilroy shall receive a written status report and shell have the right
to examine Butcher's expense records as to the Mountain Dell property
at any reasonable time.
11.

Butcher agrees not to represent or- hold out to any

public official, creditor or any other person that Gilroy is a JMH-IJI'-J ,
joint venturer, or stands in a principal-agent relationship v.»1 h
J-.oi c-h'.-j .

Whenever Gilroy *s name shall appear in all such doc*' ;r-n1 s

there1 shall be a disclosure of the fact that Gilroy has- not undertaken any responsibility or liability in connection with the approval
of the subdivision or any developmental work of any kind or nature
whatsoever.
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12.

Butchers herewith waive and abandon any and all claims

as against Gilroy by reason of that certain agreement dated July 20,
1963, between Marlowe Investment Company as Seller and Butchers as
Buyer, and herewith acknowledge that they will assert no claim of
any kind or nature by reason of any acts which at any time have been
occurred by Marlowe Investment Company, or Peter M. Lowe or by reason
of tbnt certain agreement between Gilroy and Lowe dated February 3,
1903.

Butchers, however, reserve all rights and claims against the

defendants Lowe and Marlowe.
13.

An escrow arrangement is contemplated in connection with

tin's transaction, and the parties agree to pay escrow fees hQ% by
each parly*

The escrow instructions shall provide for a release of

Jots upon payment to Gilioy of the net proceeds of sales thereof, with
the provision that in no event shall there be any release of Jots without payment to Gilroy of the net proceeds in each instance. Any
property taxes and assessments paid by Gilroy shall be repaid to
Gilroy and shall be added to Gilroy's interest in the proceeds payable
hereunder.

Upon payment of Die full balance* due to Gilroy, plus

interest, the escrow shall be closed and Gilroy shall convey his
remaining right, title and interest in and to the property to Butcher.
In the event that Gilroy lias not been paid all sums due within 12
months after subdivision approval, the escrow agent shall be instructed
to list the properties for sale over the multiple lisling bureau of
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, at appraisal value.
IN.

Butchers' rights shall be determined entirely by reason

of this contract, and no other or further agreements exist. Any
modifications of the foregoing agreement shall be in writing signed
by the- parties.
IS.

It is understood that both parties to this Agreement

are reserving all rights which they have or believe they have against
the (1(-fondants Peter M. Lowe, Martha Lowe and Marlowe Investment
Company.
IN VMTN1SS Wlir.kl.Ur, the pait.ies have hen unto r nbsi -i ihed
tlie.ii nanK'?. the day and yrar f i r.c t above written.

. _
ri";i>f:hi.L. h t ' i u n . r

_
i-i. •:•:». V.. G U ^ U V
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WARRANTY DEED
(Sf»«l)

FRAK X. GILROT
of

Las Vegas Wei ada

CONVEY
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of
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by.

R.G.H., H C . ,
3604 Astro C i r c l e , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

84199

S a l t Lake C i t y , S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Otah

Ten and No/100and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
the loUowktf lissiinil a c t of ss*4 m
S a l t Lake

ssrtsessaof

—DOLLARS,
Coasty,

Sttttof Ucaa:
The northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section
11, Township 1 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
EXCEPTING such documents as may refer to the rights of way
of Salt Lake and Eastern Railroad, Utah Central Railroad,
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Companies, Knight Power
Company, the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
and Salt Lake County, but which do not definitely locate said
rights of way in connection with said property.
Sibject to all current taxes, easements, restrictions and
rights of way of record or enforceable in law or equity.

WITNESS, tne and

«v*f

of

Signed kits*

fetfe?

STATE Or UTAH,
Cowry of
On tne
pmonefly

S a l t Lake
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STEVEN E. TYLER (A-3301)
RUSSELL C. KEARL (A-1780)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 531-7676

»Y
CLERK

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 3LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

WENDELL L. BUTCHER and
IRENE B. BUTCHER,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H.,
INC., a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C £4-1826
Judge John H- Bokich

Defendants
* * * * * * *

The motion of defendants Frank K. Gilroy and R.G.H.,
Inc., to dismiss the above-titled action for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted by reason that all
claims made therein are barred by the appropriate statute of
limitations, came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
John H. Rokich on Monday, February 25, 1985 at 10:00 o'clock
a.m.

Plaintiffs were represented by Marcus G. Theodore and

defendants were represented by Steven E. Tyler.

Based upon the

arguments of counsel and the Courtfs review of the memoranda
filed herein, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

All claims alleged in the plaintiffs1 First Amended

Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice because they are
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

See Utah Code

Ann., Section 78-12-23 (Repl. 1977).
2.

In the event that plaintiffs have not filed an Amended

Complaint stating a claim against defendants which is not barred
by the statute of limitations on or before March 11, 1985, this
action is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED THIS

/ %~ day of

A?3r ^

, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
K D1X0N4KNDUEY

LJL A Q*UL

John A. Rokich,
fcmrd District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

Date
Marcus G. Theodore,
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Date p&o4 SO LQ8-S
ren E. TyAttorney for Defe

£
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(2) The minor recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile, or
other object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive,
train, railway car or caboose, whether moving or standing; or
(3) The minor intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property
of another and thereby recklessly endangers human life or recklessly causes
or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of any public utility
service.
History: L. 1977, ch. 181, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act relating to parent and child;
providing that parents or legal guardians
of minors are liable up to $1,000 for
damages sustained by the minor inten-

tionally damaging, defacing, taking, or
destroying property; and providing for
damages when the minor tampers with
property and recklessly endangers human
life or recklessly causes a substantial
interruption of any public utility service,
—L. 1977, ch. 181.

78-11-21. Property damage caused by minor—When parent or guardian
not liable.—No parent or guardian shall be so liable if he or she made a
reasonable effort to supervise and direct their minor child, or in the
event the parent knew in advance of the possible taking, injury or destruction by their minor child, he or she made a reasonable effort to restrain it.
History: L. 1977, ch. 181, § 2.

CHAPTER 12
LIMITATION OP ACTIONS
Section 78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally.
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY, 78-12-2 to 78-12-21.
2.

OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY, 78-12-22 to 78-12-34.

3.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS, 78-12-35 to 78-12-47,,

78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally.—Civil actions
can be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter,
after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where in special cases
a different limitation is prescribed by statute.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Collection agency bond, actions on, 12
Supp., 104-12-1.
1-3.
Common carriers, claims and actions for
CompUer's Notes.
i 0S s or damage to freight, 54-3-16.
This section is identical to former secContracts for sale of goods, 70A-2-725.
tion 104-2-1 (Code 1943) which was reCounties, claims and actions against, 17pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
15-10, 17-15-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-15, 78-12-30.
County service areas, legality of bonds
Cross-References.
a n a proceedings, 17-29-28.
Accident and sickness insurance policy
County water and sewer districts, 17provisions, actions on, 31-33-14.
6-3, 17-6-3.11.
Affirmative defense, statute of limitaFraternal benefit societies, actions on
tions as, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule benefit certificates or contracts, 31-29-20.
8(c).
Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1 et
Bank statements, when presumed final, seq.
7-3-51.
Improvement district proceedings, 10Cemetery maintenance districts, validity 16-28.
of organization, 8-1-7.
Metropolitan water districts, 73-8-17, 73Cities and towns, claims and actions 8-30.
against, 10-7-77, 11-14-21, 63-30-13, 63-30Model Marketable Title Act, 57-9-1 et
15, 78-12-29, 78-12-30.
seq.
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Beceivership proceedings as suspending
statute of limitations, 21 A. L. B. 961.
Revival of judgment by constructive
service of process upon nonresident, as
affected by due process and full faith and
credit clauses, 144 A. L. B. 403.
Bight of foreign corporation to plead
statute of limitations, 122 A. L. B. 1194.
Bule that adverse possession of successive holders may be tacked, in determination of period of limitation, as applicable
to chattels, 135 A. L. B. 711.
Bunning of limitation as to action by
public body against officer or employee
is deferred until defendant ceases to be
officer or employee, or until the end of his
term of office or employment, 137 A. L. B.
674.
Bunning of statute of limitations as
affected by uncertainty as to existence
of a cause of action because of delay in
settling or determining a matter of general or governmental concern upon which
it depends, 135 A. L. B. 1339.
State statute of limitations as affecting
action or proceeding by federal government or its officials, 61 A. L. B. 412.
Statute of limitations as applicable to
action by municipality or other political
subdivision in absence of specific provision
in that regard, 113 A. L. B. 376.
Statute of limitations: effect of delay in
appointing administrator or other representative on cause of action accruing at or

after death of person in whose favor it
would have accrued, 28 A. L. B. 3d 1141.
Substitution, or addition, as plaintiff, after limitation period, of assignee, or trustee in bankruptcy, in action commenced
by assignor, or bankrupt, within limitation period, but after assignment or bankruptcy, 105 A. L. B. 610.
Tolling of statute of limitations where
process is not served before expiration of
limitation period, as affected by statutes
defining commencement of action, or expressly relating to interruption of running
of limitations, 27 A. L. B. 2d 236.
Validity, and applicability to causes of
action not already barred, of a statute
enlarging limitation period, 79 A. L. B.
2d 1080.
Validity and construction of war enactments in United States suspending operation of statute of limitations, 137 A. L. B.
1440, 140 A. L. B. 1518.
When statute of limitation commences
to run against action to recover tax, 131
A. L. B. 822.
When statute of limitations commences
to run against action to recover or for conversion of, property stolen or otherwise
wrongfully taken, 136 A. L. B. 658.
Withdrawal of foreign corporation from
state as tolling statute of limitations as
to action against corporation, 133 A. L.
B. 774.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Money judgment.
Notwithstanding former 104-37-6 permitting enforcement of judgment after lapse
of eight years, an action upon a money
judgment could not be brought after expiration of eight years. Youngdale v.
Burton, 102 U. 169, 128 P. 2d 1053.

Tolling statute.
In action by administrator, indebtedness
created by check was held to be barred,
and statute was not tolled by unauthorized
acts of plaintiff. Bingham v. Walker Bros.,
Bankers, 75 U. 149, 283 P. 1055.

78-12-23. Within six years.—Within six years:
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real property.
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon
an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in the preceding section
[78-12-22].
History: L. 1951, ca. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-23.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-22 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Cross-References.
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 78-15-3.
Promise to pay extends period, 78-12-44.

Accounting.
Mere dissolution of partnership did not
of itself give rise to a cause of action in
partners so as to start running of statute;
absent proof to establish claim was barred
by statute of limitations, it was error to
nonsuit plaintiff in his action for accounting. Kimball v. McCornick, 70 U. 189, 259
P. 313.
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78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here.
78-12-46. "Action" includes special proceeding.
78-12-47. Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in malpractice actions.

78-12-35.

Effect of absence from state.—If when a cause of action

accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be
commenced within the term herein limited after his return to the state;
and if after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time
of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of
the action.
History: L. 1951, CJL 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-35.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-36 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Application of section.
The full time that the debtor is out of
the state must be excluded in computing
the time, notwithstanding fact that
debtor's family may have residence or
place of abode in state and that service of
process could be made upon some member
of debtor's family at its residence or
place of abode. Keith-O'Brien Co. v.
Snyder, 51 U. 227, 169 P. 954, applying
former statute.
Statute runs only during time debtor
is openly in state, and immediately on
his leaving it the statute again ceases to
run until his return; in computing time
all periods of absence must be considered
and added together. Keith-O'Brien Co. v.
Snyder, 51 U. 227, 169 P. 954, applying
former statute.
Maintenance of residence within state
with persons living therein did not prevent tolling of statute of limitations.
Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 XJ.
391, 231 P. 123, applying former statute.
Construction of section.
Although generally statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed, it is
also a well-recognized doctrine that when
such statutes contain provisions excepting certain persons or classes from operation of statutes, those exceptions are to
be strictlv construed. Lawson v. Tripp,
34 U. 28, 95 P. 520.
Laches.
Absence of defendant from state does
not preclude interposition of defense of
laches to suit for an accounting, even
though statute of limitations has not
barred proceeding. Smith v. Smith, 77 U.
60, 291 P. 298.

Proof of residence or nonresidence.
A finding that defendant had his home,
family and residence in state continuously from time debt was contracted is
sufficient finding of continuous presence
in the state. Woolf v. Gray, 48 U. 239,
158 P. 788.
Plaintiff seeking to toll statute has burden of proof; mere proof of nonresidence
is not a prima facie showing of absence
from state. Tracey v. Blood, 78 U. 385, 3
P. 2d 263, applying identically worded
Idaho statute.
Tolling of statute as to foreign corporation.
Where answer of defendant foreign corporation set up statute of limitations as
defense and face of pleadings and uncontradicted evidence indicated statute had
run, it was incumbent on plaintiff to state
in his reply conditions tolling the statute;
in Utah, foreign corporation's privilege of
pleading statute of limitations was not
conditioned on its compliance with "doing
business within the state" statutes. Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co., 72 XJ.
137, 269 P. 147, 59 A. L. E. 1318, applying
former statutes.
Words and phrases defined.
The words "return" and "departs" in
this section comprehend all persons who
are without the state, and are not confined to the inhabitants thereof. Buraes
v. Crane, 1 U. 179, applying former statute.
Word "return" as used in this section
includes nonresidents as well as citizens
of state who have gone abroad and returned to state; the words "return to the
state" are held to be equivalent to "come
into the state." Lawson v. Tripp, 34 U.
28, 95 P. 520, applying former statute.
Collateral References.
Limitation of Actions^=>8<4, 85.
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 211.
51 Am. Jur. 2d 725 et seq.J( Limitation of
Actions § 154 et seq.
Absence of judgment debtor from state
as suspending or tolling running of period
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tion 104-2-44 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Collateral References.
Limitation of Actions<§=220.

54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §220.
51 Am. J u r . 2d 747, Limitation of Actions § 178.

78-12-44. Payment—Acknowledgment—Promise to pay extends period.
—In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or
interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing
liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have been
made, an action may be brought within the period prescribed for the
same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be
charged thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provisions of
any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or ground
of defense.
History: L. 1951, c k 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,t,
Supp., 104-12-44.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-45 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Acknowledgment or promise.
What constitutes an acknowledgment orr
promise in writing depends, of course, upona
the language thereof. Boukofsky v. Powers, 1 U. 333, applying former statute.
Stating of account between the partiesg
will not take case out of statute, unless3
such stating is "in writing, signed by thee
party to be charged thereby." AnthonyY
u
& Co. v. Savage, 2 U. 466, applying C. L.
1876, p. 369, § 1126.
A written acknowledgement of an indebtedness upon open account, already
barred, and a promise in writing to payL
Y
the same, contained in a letter froma
debtor to creditor, becomes a new promisee
in writing, and will not be barred untilj
four years from date of new promise.in
Gruenberg v. Buhring, 5 U. 414, 16 Pi].
486, applying former statutes.
A verbal agreement or new promisee
based upon a prior agreement barred byJ
statute comes within this section. Whitehill v. Lowe, 10 U. 419, 37 P . 589, applying
&
2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3165.
Letter from defendant to plaintiff heldd
denial that defendant was indebted too
plaintiff in any sum at time of letter's3
date, rather than acknowledgment of andi
promise to pay amount formerly owing too
plaintiff by defendant. Thomas v. Glen-L"
dinning, 13 U. 47, 44 P. 652, applying former statute.
Acknowledgment from which by impli-ication of law promise is to be raised oughtt
to be direct and unqualified admission off

previous, subsisting debt for which debtor
is liable and which he intends to pay.
Kuhn v. Mount, 13 U. 108, 44 P . 1036,
applying former statute.
Under former statute, promise sufficient
to create new or continuing contract and
to remove bar of statute was required to
be express, clear, and unequivocal; if there
were any conditions or contingency annexed, proof was required to show that
such conditions had been performed and
such contingency had happened, so as to
raise qualified promise into one which
was absolute and unqualified. Kuhn v.
Mount, 13 U. 108, 44 P. 1036.
Where promise or acknowledgment raises
at best—because vague and indeterminate
—mere probable inference of intention to
pay, and may affect minds of different
persons differently, it should not be held
sufficient to evidence new cause of action.
Kuhn v. Mount, 13 U. 108, 44 P . 1036,
applying former statute.
Under former statute, held t h a t letters
written by maker of note to payees thereof contained, not only admission of, but
also promise to pay, debt evidenced by
note, and, under evidence, etc., were sufficient to remove bar of statute. Kuhn v.
Mount, 13 U. 108, 44 P . 1036.
A mere acknowledgment of an existing
liability is insufficient to revive the debt,
but no set phrase or particular form of
language is required. Anything that will
indicate that the party making the acknowledgment admits that he is still liable
on the claim is sufficient to revive the
debt. O'Donnell v. Parker, 48 U. 578, 160
P. 1192, applying former statute.
Merely scheduling a claim in petition in
bankruptcy does not operate to waive the
statute of limitations, or constitute an
acknowledgment that will revive the debt.
O'Donnell v. Parker, 48 U. 578, 160 P.
1192, applying former statutes.
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